Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00071-1zbMath1076.91014OpenAlexW2157771656MaRDI QIDQ1411033

Masaki Aoyagi

Publication date: 15 October 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00071-1

zbMATH Keywords

CollusionAuctionRepeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (21)

Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions ⋮ Bidder collusion ⋮ Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication ⋮ Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry ⋮ Optimal implicit collusion in repeated procurement auctions ⋮ Private monitoring in auctions ⋮ Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability ⋮ Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions ⋮ Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring ⋮ Collusion with capacity constraints under a sales maximization rationing rule ⋮ Efficient chip strategies in repeated games ⋮ Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors ⋮ Bidder collusion at first-price auctions ⋮ Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions ⋮ Ratifiability of efficient collusive mechanisms in second-price auctions with participation costs ⋮ Reserve prices in repeated auctions ⋮ Taking turns ⋮ Optimal collusion with internal contracting ⋮ Commitment in first-price auctions ⋮ Bribing in second-price auctions ⋮ Optimal collusion-proof auctions

Cites Work

• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
• Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending-Bid Auctions
• Multistage Games with Communication
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
• Collusion and Price Rigidity

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