A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule
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Publication:1411093
DOI10.1007/s00199-002-0344-1zbMath1060.91043OpenAlexW2026528398MaRDI QIDQ1411093
Jerry S. Kelly, Donald E. Campbell
Publication date: 16 October 2003
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0344-1
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