Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining

DOI10.1007/s001990200330zbMath1098.91011OpenAlexW1982845045MaRDI QIDQ1411096

Hongbin Cai

Publication date: 16 October 2003

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990200330

zbMATH Keywords

Markov equilibriumInefficiencyMultilateral bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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