The Borda rule, Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability

DOI10.1007/s00199-002-0318-3zbMath1044.91012OpenAlexW1986608851MaRDI QIDQ1411103

Shmuel Nitzan, Eyal Baharad

Publication date: 16 October 2003

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0318-3

zbMATH Keywords

majority decisiveness\(q\)-rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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