Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions.
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Publication:1413210
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00543-2zbMath1063.91018OpenAlexW2000548174MaRDI QIDQ1413210
Marciano Siniscalchi, Pierpaolo Battigalli
Publication date: 16 November 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00543-2
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An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence ⋮ On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information ⋮ \(p\)-best response set ⋮ Experimental internet auctions with random information retrieval ⋮ Identification of first-price auctions with non-equilibrium beliefs: a measurement error approach ⋮ Uncertain information structures and backward induction ⋮ Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning ⋮ Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions. ⋮ The e-mail game phenomenon ⋮ Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions ⋮ Value-rationalizability in auction bidding ⋮ Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items ⋮ Multidimensional private value auctions ⋮ RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS ⋮ Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance ⋮ Characterization of bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions ⋮ Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
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