A computer scientist looks at game theory.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00529-8zbMath1124.91315OpenAlexW2162428277MaRDI QIDQ1413213

Joseph Y. Halpern

Publication date: 16 November 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00529-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91A99)

Related Items (8)

Multi-round cooperative search games with multiple players ⋮ Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players ⋮ Risk analysis and decision theory: a bridge ⋮ Partial exposure in large games ⋮ Fault tolerance in large games ⋮ Application of a theorem in stochastic models of elections ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Rationality in the Full-Information Model

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