A computer scientist looks at game theory.
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1413213
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00529-8zbMath1124.91315OpenAlexW2162428277MaRDI QIDQ1413213
Publication date: 16 November 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00529-8
Related Items (8)
Multi-round cooperative search games with multiple players ⋮ Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players ⋮ Risk analysis and decision theory: a bridge ⋮ Partial exposure in large games ⋮ Fault tolerance in large games ⋮ Application of a theorem in stochastic models of elections ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Rationality in the Full-Information Model
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Knowledge and common knowledge in a Byzantine environment: Crash failures
- Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- A calculus of communicating systems
- Operating systems. An advanced course
- Agreeing to disagree
- Modelling knowledge and action in distributed systems
- Distributed games
- On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall
- On ambiguities in the interpretation of game trees
- Modeling agents as qualitative decision makers
- Epistemology Without Knowledge and Without Belief
- Knowledge and common knowledge in a distributed environment
- Impossibility of distributed consensus with one faulty process
- Reaching Agreement in the Presence of Faults
This page was built for publication: A computer scientist looks at game theory.
