On authority distributions in organizations: Equilibrium.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00130-1zbMath1054.91011OpenAlexW2157520184WikidataQ56038372 ScholiaQ56038372MaRDI QIDQ1413215

Lloyd S. Shapley, Xingwei Hu

Publication date: 16 November 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00130-1

zbMATH Keywords

Markov chainOrganizational choicePower indexSimple game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites Work

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• Optimal location of candidates in ideological space
• On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
• On authority distributions in organizations: Controls.
• An asymmetric Shapley-Shubik power index
• A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship