Evolutionarily stable sets
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Publication:1414375
DOI10.1007/s001820100059zbMath1060.91023OpenAlexW1970404295WikidataQ57920566 ScholiaQ57920566MaRDI QIDQ1414375
Dieter Balkenborg, Karl H. Schlag
Publication date: 20 November 2003
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820100059
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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