Almost global convergence to \(p\)-dominant equilibrium

DOI10.1007/s001820100067zbMath1060.91024OpenAlexW1992395430MaRDI QIDQ1414389

William H. Sandholm

Publication date: 23 November 2003

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820100067

zbMATH Keywords

coordination gamesevolutionary game theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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