On the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game

DOI10.1007/s001820100070zbMath1082.91015OpenAlexW2076664931MaRDI QIDQ1414394

Bezalel Peleg, Jens Leth Hougaard, Lars Thorlund-Petersen

Publication date: 23 November 2003

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820100070

zbMATH Keywords

the coreBalanced gamesLorenz-maximal imputations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

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