Assignment games with stable core

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Publication:1414396

DOI10.1007/s001820100072zbMath1082.91009OpenAlexW2015172067MaRDI QIDQ1414396

Tamás Solymosi, Thirukkannamangai E. S. Raghavan

Publication date: 23 November 2003

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820100072




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