Inferior players in simple games

DOI10.1007/s001820100075zbMath1082.91017OpenAlexW1975521945MaRDI QIDQ1414399

Stefan Napel, Mika Widgrén

Publication date: 23 November 2003

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.etla.fi/wp-content/uploads/dp734.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamescoalition formationpower indices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (11)

MEASURING THE POWER OF PARTIES WITHIN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS ⋮ Circumstantial power: Optimal persuadable voters ⋮ Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games ⋮ Constrained core solutions for totally positive games with ordered players ⋮ Reflections on Power, Voting, and Voting Power ⋮ The Power of a Spatially Inferior Player ⋮ On the Nucleolus as a Power Index ⋮ Circumstantial Power: Some Hints for Finding Optimal Persuadable or Bribable Voters ⋮ Monotonicity of power and power measures ⋮ ``Counting power indices for games with a priori unions ⋮ Outside options, component efficiency, and stability

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