An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1414405
DOI10.1007/s001820100079zbMath1082.91024OpenAlexW2142635149MaRDI QIDQ1414405
Publication date: 23 November 2003
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/en/publications/an-axiomatization-of-the-shapley-value-using-a-fairness-property(0090365c-9bab-4367-b660-5bd0994788b6).html
Related Items (51)
The equal collective gains value in cooperative games ⋮ Duality and anti-duality in TU games applied to solutions, axioms, and axiomatizations ⋮ ALLOCATION OF FIXED COSTS: CHARACTERIZATION OF THE (DUAL) WEIGHTED SHAPLEY VALUE ⋮ Characterizations of weighted and equal division values ⋮ A new basis and the Shapley value ⋮ Symmetry, mutual dependence, and the weighted Shapley values ⋮ The Shapley value for shortest path games: a non-graph-based approach ⋮ Networks, Communication and Hierarchy: Applications to Cooperative Games ⋮ On \(\alpha\)-constant-sum games ⋮ Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications ⋮ Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games ⋮ Membership separability: a new axiomatization of the Shapley value ⋮ Polluted river problems and games with a permission structure ⋮ Group contributions in TU-games: a class of \(k\)-lateral Shapley values ⋮ Gain-loss and new axiomatizations of the Shapley value ⋮ Axioms of invariance for TU-games ⋮ Implementation and axiomatization of discounted Shapley values ⋮ Modularity and monotonicity of games ⋮ Axiomatizations of convex compromise rules for redistribution of non-negative income ⋮ Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions ⋮ Players indifferent to cooperate and characterizations of the Shapley value ⋮ 1-convex extensions of incomplete cooperative games and the average value ⋮ Coalitional games: monotonicity and core ⋮ Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value ⋮ An experiment on demand commitment bargaining ⋮ An experiment on the Nash program: a comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations of the family of Weighted priority values ⋮ A new value for cooperative games based on coalition size ⋮ Balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction for sequencing problems ⋮ Values with exogenous payments ⋮ Marginality, differential marginality, and the Banzhaf value ⋮ Characterization of an inconsistency ranking for pairwise comparison matrices ⋮ Equal loss under separatorization and egalitarian values ⋮ Weakly monotonic solutions for cooperative games ⋮ Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values ⋮ The Shapley value without efficiency and additivity ⋮ Weak differential marginality and the Shapley value ⋮ Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations ⋮ Value dividends, the Harsanyi set and extensions, and the proportional Harsanyi solution ⋮ Differential marginality, van den Brink fairness, and the Shapley value ⋮ Necessary players, myerson fairness and the equal treatment of equals ⋮ New axiomatizations of the Owen value ⋮ A new Shapley value for games with fuzzy coalitions ⋮ Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems ⋮ On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games ⋮ Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games ⋮ Consistency, weak fairness, and the Shapley value ⋮ Weakly differentially monotonic solutions for cooperative games ⋮ A decomposition of the space of TU-games using addition and transfer invariance ⋮ Properties based on relative contributions for cooperative games with transferable utilities ⋮ On a class of solidarity values
This page was built for publication: An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property
