Dominant strategies, superior information, and winner's curse in second-price auctions

DOI10.1007/s001820100087zbMath1083.91008OpenAlexW1993924634MaRDI QIDQ1414411

Aner Sela, Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Ram Orzach

Publication date: 23 November 2003

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820100087

zbMATH Keywords

differential informationwinner's cursedominant strategiescommon-value second-price auctionsinformation superiority

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (9)

Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps ⋮ Information in Tullock contests ⋮ Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information ⋮ Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information ⋮ The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly. ⋮ Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values ⋮ Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions ⋮ Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information ⋮ Information advantage in Cournot oligopoly

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