Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
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Publication:1414412
DOI10.1007/s001820100088zbMath1083.91046OpenAlexW1987891901MaRDI QIDQ1414412
Eiichi Miyagawa, Bettina Klaus
Publication date: 23 November 2003
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820100088
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (21)
Overlapping multiple object assignments ⋮ Pareto Optimal Matchings in Many-to-Many Markets with Ties ⋮ Allocating indivisible goods to strategic agents: pure Nash equilibria and fairness ⋮ Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods ⋮ Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites ⋮ Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods ⋮ On maximum weighted Nash welfare for binary valuations ⋮ Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules ⋮ Fairly taking turns ⋮ Weighted fair division with matroid-rank valuations: monotonicity and strategyproofness ⋮ The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods ⋮ Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets ⋮ Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods. ⋮ Fair allocation of indivisible goods: the two-agent case ⋮ Markets for public decision-making ⋮ Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many markets with ties ⋮ On the operation of multiple matching markets ⋮ Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems ⋮ A general branch-and-bound algorithm for fair division problems ⋮ Strategy-proof popular mechanisms ⋮ Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market
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