Voting for voters: the unanimity case

DOI10.1007/s001820200100zbMath1082.91039OpenAlexW1999922619MaRDI QIDQ1414442

Jonathan Shalev, Daniel Granot, Michael Maschler

Publication date: 23 November 2003

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820200100

zbMATH Keywords

electionsgame theoryvotingnoncooperative gamesclubspure-strategy equilibrium profilesrefinements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12)

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