Allocation processes in cooperative games

DOI10.1007/s001820200123zbMath1083.91023OpenAlexW1974222272MaRDI QIDQ1414455

Ehud Lehrer

Publication date: 23 November 2003

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820200123

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuecorecooperative gameleast-coreleast square valueAllocation process

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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