Buyer-seller exactness in the assignment game
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Publication:1414462
DOI10.1007/s001820300128zbMath1083.91026OpenAlexW2246321947MaRDI QIDQ1414462
Publication date: 23 November 2003
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820300128
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof ⋮ A simple procedure to obtain the extreme core allocations of an assignment market ⋮ Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs: the case of assignment games ⋮ Assignment markets that are uniquely determined by their core ⋮ A survey on assignment markets ⋮ Assignment markets with the same core ⋮ Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions in the assignment market ⋮ An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game ⋮ A unifying model for matrix-based pairing situations ⋮ On the dimension of the core of the assignment game ⋮ A note on assignment games with the same nucleolus ⋮ Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems ⋮ Cooperative assignment games with the inverse Monge property ⋮ A glove-market partitioned matrix related to the assignment game
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