A solution to the problem of consumption externalities.
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Publication:1415908
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00079-4zbMath1081.91002OpenAlexW2167015664MaRDI QIDQ1415908
Publication date: 9 December 2003
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(02)00079-4
Noncooperative games (91A10) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (4)
Computing the strong Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games ⋮ Computing the strong \(L_p\)-Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games: convergence and uniqueness ⋮ Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations ⋮ Theory of negative consumption externalities with applications to the economics of happiness
Cites Work
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