``Agreeing to disagree type results: a decision-theoretic approach.
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Publication:1415909
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(03)00003-XzbMath1054.91019MaRDI QIDQ1415909
Publication date: 9 December 2003
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Decision theory (91B06) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Knowledge representation (68T30)
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Cites Work
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