A short proof of Harsanyi's purification theorem.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00149-0zbMath1069.91005OpenAlexW2066185170WikidataQ29031578 ScholiaQ29031578MaRDI QIDQ1416500

Arthur J. Robson, Srihari Govindan, Philip J. Reny

Publication date: 14 December 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00149-0

zbMATH Keywords

Regular equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (7)

Robust rational turnout ⋮ On participation games with complete information ⋮ Regular potential games ⋮ Correlated equilibrium existence for infinite games with type-dependent strategies ⋮ Purification and roulette wheels ⋮ Evolutionary equilibrium in Bayesian routing games: specialization and niche formation ⋮ Regularity and robustness in monotone Bayesian games

Cites Work

• Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a unification of the classical and Bayesian views
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Approximate Purification of Mixed Strategies
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