Regret-based continuous-time dynamics.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00178-7zbMath1134.91313OpenAlexW2162006934WikidataQ56936130 ScholiaQ56936130MaRDI QIDQ1416502

Andreu Mas-Colell, Sergiu Hart

Publication date: 14 December 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00178-7

zbMATH Keywords

potential gamescontinuous-timeregret-based dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Dynamic games (91A25)

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Cites Work

• An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
• Conditional universal consistency.
• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
• A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
• Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games
• On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play
• A general class of adaptive strategies
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