Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00147-7zbMath1069.91006OpenAlexW2147563197MaRDI QIDQ1416505

Martin J. Osborne, Ariel Rubinstein

Publication date: 14 December 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00147-7

zbMATH Keywords

Bounded rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (11)

Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection ⋮ Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics ⋮ Stable biased sampling ⋮ Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: simple formulas and applications ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Stable sampling in repeated games ⋮ Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results ⋮ Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information ⋮ Modeling players with random ``data access ⋮ Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information ⋮ Strategic manipulation in judgment aggregation under higher-level reasoning

Cites Work

• Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games

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