The equilibrium set of two-player games with complementarities is a sublattice
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Publication:1416759
DOI10.1007/S00199-002-0337-0zbMath1052.91005OpenAlexW1966319760MaRDI QIDQ1416759
Publication date: 16 December 2003
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0337-0
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