Optimal tax enforcement with imperfect tax payers and inspectors

DOI10.1023/A:1024447210230zbMath1052.91070OpenAlexW142320191MaRDI QIDQ1417359

P. A. Vasina

Publication date: 4 January 2004

Published in: Computational Mathematics and Modeling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1024447210230

zbMATH Keywords

corruptibilitytax evation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (2)

Analysis of Economic Behaviour in Evolutionary Model of Tax Control Under Information Diffusion ⋮ The research on coordinated decision-making method tax system based on subject data

This page was built for publication: Optimal tax enforcement with imperfect tax payers and inspectors