Evolutionary insights on the willingness to communicate

DOI10.1007/S001820300136zbMath1052.91027OpenAlexW2027874406MaRDI QIDQ1417443

Karl H. Schlag, Sjaak Hurkens

Publication date: 5 January 2004

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820300136

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkevolutionarily stable setspure coordination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (5)

Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ Evolution of risk-taking behaviour and status preferences in anti-coordination games ⋮ Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values ⋮ Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification ⋮ Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions

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