Noncooperative selection of the core

DOI10.1007/s001820300137zbMath1066.91011OpenAlexW2041612663MaRDI QIDQ1417445

Huibin Yan

Publication date: 5 January 2004

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820300137

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining powerrandom proposers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (16)

Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core ⋮ The Nash bargaining solution in general \(n\)-person cooperative games ⋮ Dynamic multilateral markets ⋮ Coalition formation in games with externalities ⋮ Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining ⋮ A repeated coalitional bargaining model ⋮ The stationary equilibrium of three-person coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: a classification ⋮ UNIQUENESS IN RANDOM-PROPOSER MULTILATERAL BARGAINING ⋮ Reflections on Power, Voting, and Voting Power ⋮ Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games ⋮ Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: theory and application ⋮ A note on selection of proposers in coalitional bargaining ⋮ Dynamics of Profit-Sharing Games ⋮ A noncooperative bargaining game with endogenous protocol and partial breakdown ⋮ The burning coalition bargaining model ⋮ An experiment on a core controversy

This page was built for publication: Noncooperative selection of the core