Risk, pre-play communication and equilibrium.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00115-5zbMath1062.91529OpenAlexW2014929929MaRDI QIDQ1420510

Martin Sefton, Anthony C. Burton

Publication date: 2 February 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00115-5

zbMATH Keywords

EquilibriumCommunicationExperimental gamesCheap talk

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (5)

The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria ⋮ The power and limits of sequential communication in coordination games ⋮ How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information? ⋮ Output restriction and the ratchet effect: evidence from a real-effort work task ⋮ When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory

Cites Work

• The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
• A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk
• When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis
• Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann's conjecture
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Promises and Partnership

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