A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00148-9zbMath1069.91023OpenAlexW3122705177MaRDI QIDQ1420511

Francesco De Sinopoli

Publication date: 2 February 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00148-9

zbMATH Keywords

Citizen-candidateMertens' stable setsRefinements of Nash equilibriumVoting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Weak undominance in scoring rule elections

Cites Work

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• Persistent equilibria in strategic games
• Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games
• Stable equilibria and forward induction
• The small worlds axiom for stable equilibria
• Stability and the chain store paradox
• Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates

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