When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
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Publication:1420512
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00050-2zbMath1069.91002WikidataQ70743404 ScholiaQ70743404MaRDI QIDQ1420512
Publication date: 2 February 2004
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
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