Ordinal invariance in multicoalitional bargaining.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00046-0zbMath1146.91312MaRDI QIDQ1420513

Özgür Kıbrıs

Publication date: 2 February 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

ruleAllocation problemsBennett ruleExtreme-BennettMulticoalitional bargainingOrdinal invarianceShapley-Shubik rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Egalitarianism in ordinal bargaining: the Shapley-Shubik rule, Nash bargaining in ordinal environments, A logic-based axiomatic model of bargaining, A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule

Cites Work

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• Nash bargaining in ordinal environments
• The Bargaining Problem
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