Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00041-1zbMath1146.91333MaRDI QIDQ1420514

Wojciech Olszewski

Publication date: 2 February 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Coalition strategy-proof mechanismExcludable public good

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (7)

A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights ⋮ Strategy-proof rules for an excludable public good ⋮ Sharing the cost of a public good: an incentive-constrained axiomatic approach ⋮ Serial cost sharing of an excludable public good available in multiple units ⋮ Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities ⋮ A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good ⋮ On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good

Cites Work

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• Serial Cost Sharing
• Incentives in Teams
• Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
• Mixed serial cost sharing.
• Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency

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