Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring.
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Publication:1420518
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00116-7zbMath1069.91015MaRDI QIDQ1420518
Publication date: 2 February 2004
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
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