The possibility of speculative trade between dynamically consistent agents.
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Publication:1420523
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00044-7zbMath1069.91081MaRDI QIDQ1420523
Publication date: 2 February 2004
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (7)
``Agreeing to disagree type results under ambiguity ⋮ Information-based trade ⋮ Agreeing to disagree and dilation ⋮ Bayesian learning with multiple priors and nonvanishing ambiguity ⋮ Speculation under unawareness ⋮ Interim efficient allocations under uncertainty ⋮ Learning (to disagree?) in large worlds
Cites Work
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- Betweenness satisfying preferences and dynamic choice
- On the logic of ``agreeing to disagree type results
- Consequentialist foundations for expected utility
- Information, trade and common knowledge
- Agreeing to disagree
- Decomposable choice under uncertainty
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- A Theory of Disappointment Aversion
- A More Robust Definition of Subjective Probability
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