L. S. Penrose's limit theorem: proof of some special cases.
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Publication:1420527
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00069-6zbMath1069.91025OpenAlexW2140454325MaRDI QIDQ1420527
Publication date: 2 February 2004
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(03)00069-6
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