On two new social choice correspondences.

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00070-2zbMath1069.91027MaRDI QIDQ1420528

Marco Slikker, René van den Brink, René Levínský, P. E. M. Borm

Publication date: 2 February 2004

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto optimalitytop cycle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

On a compromise social choice correspondence, A note on the \(\beta\)-measure for digraph competitions, Internal slackening scoring methods

Cites Work

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