Which acceptable agreements are equilibria?

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00084-2zbMath1069.91008MaRDI QIDQ1420532

Sylvie Thoron

Publication date: 2 February 2004

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Coalition formationCartelEnvironmental agreementPublic good

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Related Items (1)

A note on cartel stability and endogenous sequencing with tacit collusion

Cites Work

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• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• A model of agreements in strategic form games
• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
• On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Stable cartels revisited
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions

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