From evolutionary to strategic stability.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00078-4zbMath1102.91308MaRDI QIDQ1420876

Klaus Ritzberger, Stefano De Michelis

Publication date: 23 January 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Dynamic stabilityEvolutionary game theoryIndex theoryStrategic stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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