Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00087-5zbMath1069.91033OpenAlexW2148444925MaRDI QIDQ1420880

Seok-ju Cho, John Duggan

Publication date: 23 January 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00087-5

zbMATH Keywords

BargainingStationary equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Minimax problems in mathematical programming (90C47) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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A bargaining model of endogenous procedures ⋮ One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities ⋮ Bargaining under monotonicity constraints ⋮ Voting in legislative elections under plurality rule ⋮ Spatial bargaining in rectilinear facility location problem ⋮ A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model ⋮ Computation of equilibrium values in the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining model ⋮ Sequential share bargaining ⋮ A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games ⋮ Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining ⋮ Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members ⋮ Distortion-Free Logrolling Mechanism ⋮ Bargaining one-dimensional social choices ⋮ Intergovernmental negotiation, willingness to compromise, and voter preference reversals ⋮ One-dimensional bargaining ⋮ On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria ⋮ Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules ⋮ Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players ⋮ Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem ⋮ Procedural fairness and redistributive proportional tax

Cites Work

• Order restricted preferences and majority rule
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining
• Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
• A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information

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