Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
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Publication:1421886
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00109-1zbMath1059.91066OpenAlexW3021333274MaRDI QIDQ1421886
Karsten Fieseler, Benny Moldovanu, Thomas Kittsteiner
Publication date: 3 February 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00109-1
Related Items (25)
Mechanism design goes to war: Peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types ⋮ On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching ⋮ Efficient dissolution of partnerships and the structure of control ⋮ Informationally robust trade and limits to contagion ⋮ Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms: comparison between one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information environments ⋮ Incentives and justice for sequencing problems ⋮ A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share ⋮ Informed principal problems in bilateral trading ⋮ Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations ⋮ Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently ⋮ Ex-post implementation with interdependent values ⋮ Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations. ⋮ On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality ⋮ Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values ⋮ Partnership dissolution and proprietary information ⋮ Dissolving (in)effective partnerships ⋮ Ex post implementation ⋮ Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions ⋮ Incentive compatible market design with applications ⋮ Competitive bargaining equilibrium ⋮ Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade ⋮ Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs ⋮ An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations ⋮ Merger negotiations and ex-post regret ⋮ Bargaining over bets
Cites Work
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Efficient allocation with continuous quantities
- Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
- A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- Bayesian and weakly robust first best mechanisms: Characterizations
- Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations.
- Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Optimal Auction Design
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- Efficient Auctions
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- An Efficient Auction
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