Efficiency and surplus bounds in Cournot competition.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00089-9zbMath1059.91024OpenAlexW2568765813MaRDI QIDQ1421888

Régis Renault, Simon P. Anderson

Publication date: 3 February 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00089-9

zbMATH Keywords

performanceMarketDeadweight loss

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (14)

Surplus sharing in Cournot oligopoly ⋮ On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ Efficiency loss in a Cournot oligopoly with convex market demand ⋮ Characterizing agent behavior in revision games with uncertain deadline ⋮ On the curvature of homogeneous functions ⋮ Conflict between consumer and worker surpluses under monopoly power ⋮ Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition ⋮ The supermodularity of the tax competition game ⋮ Market-dependent preferences, positive and negative network effects and welfare ⋮ Cournot equilibrium revisited ⋮ Cournot games with biconcave demand ⋮ Profit loss in Cournot oligopolies ⋮ Near-optimality of second price mechanisms in a class of asymmetric auctions ⋮ A lower-bound on monopoly profit for log-concave demand

Cites Work

• On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium
• Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem
• Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On the Existence of Equilibrium
• Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition

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