A multinomial probit model of stochastic evolution.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00069-3zbMath1158.91307MaRDI QIDQ1421890

David P. Myatt, Chris C. Wallace

Publication date: 3 February 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Dominated strategiesIdiosyncrasyMultinomial probitStochastic evolution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05)

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• Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions

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