A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment.
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Publication:1421899
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00120-0zbMath1059.91010OpenAlexW3123241437MaRDI QIDQ1421899
Rohan Pitchford, Christopher M. Snyder
Publication date: 3 February 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00120-0
Public goods (91B18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Dynamic games (91A25)
Related Items (6)
KNOWLEDGE ACCUMULATION WITHIN AN ORGANIZATION ⋮ Strategic information exchange ⋮ Split it up to create incentives: investment, public goods and crossing the river ⋮ Bargaining and exclusivity in a borrower-lender relationship ⋮ Incremental approaches to establishing trust ⋮ The dynamics of productive assets, contract duration and holdup
Cites Work
- Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach
- Monotone games with positive spillovers
- Does evolution solve the hold-up problem?
- Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999)
- An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
- Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
- Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
- Staged Financing: An Agency Perspective
- Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
- Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem
- Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
- Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games
- Joint Projects without Commitment
- Gradualism and Irreversibility
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
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