A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00120-0zbMath1059.91010OpenAlexW3123241437MaRDI QIDQ1421899

Rohan Pitchford, Christopher M. Snyder

Publication date: 3 February 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00120-0

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete contractsgamesContribution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (6)

KNOWLEDGE ACCUMULATION WITHIN AN ORGANIZATION ⋮ Strategic information exchange ⋮ Split it up to create incentives: investment, public goods and crossing the river ⋮ Bargaining and exclusivity in a borrower-lender relationship ⋮ Incremental approaches to establishing trust ⋮ The dynamics of productive assets, contract duration and holdup

Cites Work

• Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach
• Monotone games with positive spillovers
• Does evolution solve the hold-up problem?
• Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999)
• An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
• Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
• Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
• Staged Financing: An Agency Perspective
• Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
• Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem
• Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
• Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games
• Joint Projects without Commitment
• Gradualism and Irreversibility
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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