Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00128-5zbMath1059.91030OpenAlexW2063487923MaRDI QIDQ1421903

Andrzej Skrzypacz, Hugo A. Hopenhayn

Publication date: 3 February 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00128-5

zbMATH Keywords

repeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (30)

Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions ⋮ Bidder collusion ⋮ Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication ⋮ Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry ⋮ Discounted quotas ⋮ Optimal implicit collusion in repeated procurement auctions ⋮ Private monitoring in auctions ⋮ Flow auctions ⋮ Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions! ⋮ From equals to despots: the dynamics of repeated decision making in partnerships with private information ⋮ Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability ⋮ Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions ⋮ Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring ⋮ Collusion through communication in auctions ⋮ Dynamics of market making algorithms in dealer markets: Learning and tacit collusion ⋮ Using turn taking to achieve intertemporal cooperation and symmetry in infinitely repeated \(2 \times 2\) games ⋮ Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions. ⋮ Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors ⋮ Bidder collusion at first-price auctions ⋮ Tacit collusion in repeated auctions. ⋮ Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions ⋮ Ratifiability of efficient collusive mechanisms in second-price auctions with participation costs ⋮ Variable temptations and black mark reputations ⋮ Taking turns ⋮ Optimal collusion with internal contracting ⋮ Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case ⋮ Commitment in first-price auctions ⋮ Bribing in second-price auctions ⋮ Optimal collusion-proof auctions ⋮ Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
• Collusion and Price Rigidity

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