Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game.

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00067-2zbMath1064.91011OpenAlexW2067236897MaRDI QIDQ1421921

Marilda Sotomayor

Publication date: 3 February 2004

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(03)00067-2

zbMATH Keywords

optimal matchingAssignment game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (11)

Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game ⋮ On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games ⋮ On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory ⋮ Paths to stability in the assignment problem ⋮ Consistency in one-sided assignment problems ⋮ Two-Sided Matching Models ⋮ Does it make sense to analyse a two-sided market as a multi-choice game? ⋮ Enforcing fair cooperation in production-inventory settings with heterogeneous agents ⋮ On the dimension of the core of the assignment game ⋮ Another proof that assignment games have singleton cores only if multiple optimal matchings exist

Cites Work

• The assignment game. I: The core
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game.