Best-reply matching in games.
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Publication:1421925
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00065-9zbMath1064.91004MaRDI QIDQ1421925
Mark Voorneveld, Edward Droste, Michael Kosfeld
Publication date: 3 February 2004
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (2)
Competitive centipede games: zero-end payoffs and payoff inequality deter reciprocal cooperation ⋮ A myopic adjustment process leading to best-reply matching.
Cites Work
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