A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination.

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00050-7zbMath1059.91022OpenAlexW2141338807MaRDI QIDQ1421928

Gerhard J. Woeginger

Publication date: 3 February 2004

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(03)00050-7

zbMATH Keywords

Scoring rulesRespecting majority

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization ⋮ Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context ⋮ The scoring rules in an endogenous election ⋮ Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules

Cites Work

• Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously
• Une caractérisation du vote à la majorité simple
• Regles positionnelles iteratives, principe majoritaire et preferences unimodales
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
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