Neutrality in arrow and other impossibility theorems

DOI10.1007/s00199-002-0353-0zbMath1069.91029OpenAlexW2054150524MaRDI QIDQ1422247

Luis Ubeda

Publication date: 5 February 2004

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0353-0

zbMATH Keywords

Social choiceStrategy-proofSmall domains

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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