Loss aversion equilibrium
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Publication:1423662
DOI10.1007/s001820000038zbMath1053.91015OpenAlexW2068870786MaRDI QIDQ1423662
Publication date: 7 March 2004
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820000038
Related Items (30)
Endogenous reference points in bargaining ⋮ Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence ⋮ Introduction to the special issue in honor of Peter Wakker ⋮ Risk aversion for losses and the Nash bargaining solution ⋮ Price discrimination with loss averse consumers ⋮ On loss aversion in bimatrix games ⋮ Non-cooperative games with prospect theory players and dominated strategies ⋮ Games with switching costs and endogenous references ⋮ Reference Dependence and Market Participation ⋮ Bankruptcy problems with reference-dependent preferences ⋮ Learning in games with cumulative prospect theoretic preferences ⋮ A preference foundation for constant loss aversion ⋮ A folk theorem for endogenous reference points ⋮ The effect of loss preference on queueing with information disclosure policy ⋮ The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution with loss aversion ⋮ When normative and descriptive diverge: how to bridge the difference ⋮ Credibilistic loss aversion Nash equilibrium for bimatrix games with triangular fuzzy payoffs ⋮ Prospect dynamics and loss dominance ⋮ Expectation-based loss aversion and strategic interaction ⋮ Coordination after gains and losses: is prospect theory's value function predictive for games? ⋮ An index of loss aversion ⋮ Nonconvex Equilibrium Prices in Prediction Markets ⋮ Equilibrium Notions for Agents with Cumulative Prospect Theory Preferences ⋮ Reference-dependent expected utility with incomplete preferences ⋮ Fragility of the commons under prospect-theoretic risk attitudes ⋮ Asymmetric gain-loss reference dependence and attitudes toward uncertainty ⋮ Cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests ⋮ A revealed reference point for prospect theory ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibrium in the Rubinstein bargaining game with loss aversion ⋮ Reference-dependent aggregation in multi-attribute group decision-making
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