Two-person repeated games with finite automata

DOI10.1007/s001820000040zbMath1062.91011OpenAlexW1989293560MaRDI QIDQ1423665

Daijiro Okada, Abraham Neyman

Publication date: 7 March 2004

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820000040

zbMATH Keywords

complexityNash equilibriumfinite automatarepeated game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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